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A War of Rebellion:
Radical Politics in the Spanish Civil War
The Spanish Civil War was one of the seminal events of the twenti-
eth century. It occurred in the interim of the two most destructive 
conflicts in human history and contained adherents to every radical 
ideology at the turn of the century. This has made it a useful lens 
into the study of the revolutionary movements of the period, but to 
focus on the war solely as a sort of laboratory for radical politics or 
a prophetic text for WWII is to lose sight of its distinctly Spanish 
roots and the effect of the Spanish character both on the war itself 
and the ideologies torrenting within it. The anarchist movement in 
Spain, the only European nation where it managed to gain ac-
tionable political power and territory, provides a window into the 
uniquely Spanish nature of the war. In fact, Spanish Anarchy was 
less about the adoption and implementation of a foreign politi-
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cal ideology, such as Vladimir Lenin’s revolutionary Marxism or 
Mikhail Bakunin’s social anarchy, and more an inherently Spanish 
event. Its consistent inability to achieve coherent political goals 
once it had taken power instead suggests that it was a specific Span-
ish outlet for some essential human passion. In The Rebel, Albert 
Camus argues that the individual desire to rebel is fundamental to 
the human character. This philosophy of personal rebellion better 
explains Spanish anarchism than Bakunin´s thought. The anarchist 
movement, and other radical polemics, of the Spanish Civil War are 
closer in resemblance to Camus´s rebellious philosophy than the 
revolutionary ones of Bakunin or Marx.
The Rebel 
In The Rebel, Camus sought to unpack the centuries of revo-
lution that had marked the period since the Enlightenment and its 
rejection of the divine right of kings. He found value in  the natural 
inclination of the slave to rebel, to affirm that there is something in 
him which will not bow to every injustice, some inherent value worth 
protecting, something more precious than the mere continuance of 
his life.1  It takes no great leap to see the way in which this reasoning 
would conform with revolutionary proletarian philosophies such as 
Communism and Anarchism. When the rebel accepts his own life 
as collateral in the struggle for this greater goal, he is elevated from 
an individual struggle into a broader human one.  A single rebellion 
must be a rebellion on behalf of all mankind or it loses its source: its 
inherent humanity.2 But Camus broke from these philosophies when 
1  Albert Camus, The Rebel, Penguin Books, 2013, 1, 21-23.
2  Ibid., 12, 19.
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he differentiated between the natural human inclination for rebel-
lion and the dialectical Marxist revolutions, wherein man becomes 
subject to a greater history, and any sin committed against the indi-
vidual is absolved in this prophetic future. Using his logic of rebel-
lion Camus denied the right to tyranny in service of history. When 
the revolution puts history before the individual, he relinquishes his 
status as rebel and becomes master.3
This particular view of revolutionary politics defined the an-
archism of the Second Spanish Republic. It was a rebellious spirit 
stemming less from ideology or grand plans for a historical dialectic 
and more from a boiling rage at a history of injustices which had 
stewed for centuries. This natural human response to exploitation 
led not to a singular political revolution but to countless warring 
ideologies vying for power. In many ways, the Spanish Civil War was 
not a two-sided civil war but a series of various competing rebellions. 
As would be expected of a peasant and worker rebellion, its roots and 
causes can be found in Spain’s centuries-old problems. 
Spain before the War
 Most Spanish political movements have had a distinctly grass 
roots character. They have been, for the most part, the work of the 
peasantry and the common man who have risen up and rebelled. 
During the Reconquista, small barbarian kingdoms began the work 
of driving out the Moors and uniting under a new Christian identi-
ty. After Napoleon drove out the king and placed his brother on the 
throne, autonomous guerrilla bands of common men and women 
3 Ibid., 284-291.
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made the country too odious to rule.4 It was always the lower classes 
of Spain who acted as keepers of a fiery Iberian independence. Even 
conservative politicians such as Antonio Canovas, restorer of the 
monarchy, commented upon the indispensable nature of the Span-
ish peasant in the preservation of Spain.5 This culture of grass root 
revolution and a history of political power needing to be rescued by 
the people provided the Spanish peasant with a unique and potent 
relationship between himself and those who governed him. 
In the pre-industrial period, the church was the constant sup-
porter and refuge for these revolutionary movements. Spain’s strong 
Catholic faith provided an ideological basis as well as shelter and 
organization. Spain’s lower classes could always rely on the Church 
as a way to influence politics and vice-versa. As Enlightenment ideas 
spread throughout Europe, the strength of the Church began to 
weaken, and its fear of liberal movements grew; it turned increas-
ingly towards conservative politics and grew increasingly indebted 
and entwined with the landowning classes.6 This betrayal shattered 
working class faith and turned the clergy from a source of hope to a 
constant reminder of their oppression on heaven and earth. Once the 
Church had abandoned its traditional role as both a defender of the 
lowly and a bridge across classes, the peasantry was left with its his-
torical potency and its growing anger without any means to assuage 
it. By now they were an army awaiting an ideology. 
In this moment of need just such radical godless philosophies 
4  Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth an Account of the Social and Polit-
ical Background of the Civil War, Univ. Press, 1967, 19-20, 312-313.
5 Ibid., 318.
6 Ibid., xxv.
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were spreading throughout Europe. Spain would have representa-
tives from each, including devout Stalinists, more-moderate socialist 
unions (UGT), who focused on worker’s rights as opposed to out-
right class struggle before the war, and anarchist unions(CNT), who 
believed in the complete eradication of the state and the abolition 
of private property. These competing factions would all play cru-
cial roles in the Second Republic along with the bourgeois liberal 
republicans, but it is the unique success of the anarchist movement 
in Spain that provides the greatest insight into the radical movement 
and its fundamental roots.
Anarchism, as defined by Mikhail Bakunin, is a political phi-
losophy based foremost upon what must be destroyed as opposed 
to what should be built. Bakunin spent much of his writing arguing 
against the legitimacy of any State which requires coercion. He ar-
gued instead for willful agreements between localized autonomous 
collectives.7 Both ideas spoke profoundly to a Spanish populace 
which had been enduring an incompetent centralizing government 
that, more often than not, enforced its will at the end of a rifle.8 It 
also spoke to the inherent independence of the various Spanish prov-
inces, all of which believed they had the right to govern themselves 
better than the central government. It was for this reason that An-
archism took most readily in Catalan, with its centuries of separat-
ism, and Andalucía, where for centuries peasants had been revolting, 
abolishing currency, and collectivizing land in a medieval tradition.9 
7  Mikhail Bakunin, God and the State, Mother Earth Pub, 6-13.
8  Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth an Account of the Social and Polit-
ical Background of the Civil War, Univ. Pr, 1967, 115.
9  Ibid., 314-316.
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But what most thoroughly guides the Anarchist philosophy is rage. 
It is rebellion against society and is more concerned with declaring 
it unjust and worthy of destruction than getting lost in the weeds of 
governance. It is Camus’s slave grabbing the hand of his master and 
declaring enough is enough whether or not God or history would be 
there to redeem him afterwards. 
International Aide
 The Spanish Civil War is perhaps the most international civil 
war in history. It boasted three different foreign powers providing di-
rect intervention and assistance as well as countless volunteers from 
various nations. This foreign involvement proved crucial in the out-
come of the war. Nearly every major battle was decided by the extent 
to which each side could acquire foreign aid, a competition which 
the Nationalist rebels won handily.10 It is thus important to examine 
foreign involvement and its ideological underpinnings.
 Combatants from every major western Allied and Axis power 
would find their way into the conflict, but only the revolutionary 
states provided any official aid. The western democracies adhered to 
the Non-Intervention Agreement, wherein the European powers of 
the time and the United States agreed to avoid involvement in the 
war, including the selling of arms. Tired of the past and fearful for 
the future, they hoped to contain the conflict to Spain. Mussoli-
ni’s Italy and Nazi Germany completely and immediately broke the 
agreement, with Stalin soon following in response.11 Though hated 
10  Gabriel Jackson, A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War, Thames and 
Hudson, 1974, 12-17
11  Anthony Beevor, The Spanish Civil War, Peter Bedrick Books, 1983, 
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enemies, the German and Italian fascists and the Russian Bolsheviks 
both viewed themselves as freeing their peoples from an oppressive 
liberal world order. The liberal democracies, on the other-hand, al-
lowed a democratically elected European government to face a mili-
tary coup and slip into fascism due to fear of their radical elements. 
When the nations of the world looked to Spain, they did not see 
competing factions or a regional civil war; they saw a nest of revolu-
tionary fire. Those nations, still attached to their conservative liber-
al-institutions, wanted no part of such rebellion. 
 But it was just that rebellion which enticed multitudes of 
independent citizens to volunteer and fight for a nation which was 
not their own. Of the 4,000 Americans who served in the volunteer 
Lincoln Brigade, 100 were black men serving in the first integrated 
unit in American history, one which would be led by a black officer, 
Oliver Law, the first African-American to lead a mixed-race battal-
ion, much less a predominately white one. These men were mostly 
communists and black nationalists disillusioned with the false free-
dom of American society. They saw the fight in Spain as one for the 
emancipation of man. It was not a fight contingent solely on political 
ideals either, as they wished to intervene in the Second Italo-Ethio-
pian war, defending a heretical monarchy, the year before. It was one 
based upon self-determination and the inherent dignity of man. 12 It 
was an act of rebellion against a world which so often refused to ac-
knowledge their humanity. Similar views on the conflict were shared 
by the white veterans of the Lincoln Brigade who would go on to be 
14-22.
12  Robin D. G. Kelley, “This Ain’t Ethiopia But It’ll Do,” African Ameri-
cans In the Spanish Civil War, ed. Danny Duncan Collum, 5-43.
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blacklisted as “premature anti-fascists” during the period of McCar-
thyism.13 All these volunteers saw in Spain a great hope which they 
could not find in their own countries. They, like Camus’s slave, no 
longer identified with nation or creed but with a broader humanity 
worth the sacrifice of their own small life.
Crisis and Collapse
 Spain at the turn of the century was in crisis. It possessed 
a bloated and incompetent bureaucracy, a similarly expensive and 
incompetent army, and a monarchy with a habit of escaping to 
France at the first sign of trouble. The Spanish political system had 
no separation of powers: courts were controlled by the government, 
the cortes were elected through buying ballots or often just ignoring 
them, and political positions were bestowed through nepotism. In 
the last free election before the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, 113 
deputies were close relatives of political leaders.14 This Cosa Nostra 
system led to corruption so severe that in 1902, 50% to 80% of 
property taxes went unpaid. This gross corruption of the tax system 
benefited the large landowner over the small one who often paid 30 
to 40 pesetas per acre while the large estates paid next to nothing.15 
 The same top down corruption could be found in the mili-
tary with its own bloated officer corps. During the Moroccan War in 
1923, there were 25,000 officers to 200,000 enlisted men. 
13  John Gerassi, The Premature Antifascists: North American Volunteer in the 
Spanish Civil War 1936-39: an Oral History, Praeger, 1986, 45.
14  Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth an Account of the Social and Polit-
ical Background of the Civil War, Univ. Press, 1967, 33.
15 Ibid., 12-15.
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The military comprised over half of the Spanish budget in 1922 
and despite this was grossly anachronistic, possessing obsolete artil-
lery and entirely lacking airplanes or tanks; most of its budget went 
to officer pay instead of modern armaments. This old bloated force 
was greatly unpopular with the common people whose sons were 
sent to die by the droves in pointless and failed colonial wars. It had 
also gained a taste for declaring the government in need of saving in 
the form of its pronunciamentos, a coup by any other name.16 These 
factors made the military an unpopular institution even before the 
Civil War.
 Between the central government, the military, and the 
church, it is difficult to find a single Spanish institution that was not 
an object of ire for the common Spaniard. In the face of such un-
popular rule, the government and landowners responded with harsh 
reprisals. Strikes were violently disbanded. Anarchist leaders would 
be arrested without evidence and then shot in the back for suppos-
edly attempting escape.17 Liberal reforms did not rid the government 
of such atrocities. In 1934, a sergeant was found innocent by a mili-
tary tribunal in Burgos for the shooting of unarmed protesters which 
resulted in the death of eleven and the wounding of thirty more. 
Moments such as this drove many anarchists, including the CNT to 
proclaim that social democracies were even fouler than monarchi-
cal rule.18 The populace’s rage would boil over countless times both 
in the streets and directly against the government, which had three 
16 Ibid., 91-94.
17 Ibid., 114.
18 Julian Casanova, Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain: 1931-
1939, Taylor & Francis, 2014, 26-31.
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Prime Ministers assassinated over a twenty-year span.19 It was for 
these reasons that Manuel Azana, President of the Second Republic, 
had made order his primary objective and continued many repres-
sive policies that, unintentionally or not, supported the land-owning 
classes to the continued fury of union organizers.20 
The anger and mobilization of the under classes was not then 
strictly political, as the achievement of their political agendas rarely 
brought about an end to their actions. Even with a legitimate and 
representative government, in the process of labor and agrarian re-
forms, violence continued. It was not a revolution based upon pure 
political aims; it was a violent rebellion against an entire society 
which had become unjust and abusive, and it would not be peaceful-
ly resolved without the individual Spaniard’s dignity restored. It was 
a moral movement before a political one.
 This can be seen especially during the Civil War itself by the 
ways in which the radical movements attempted and failed to gov-
ern. At the outbreak of the war, the CNT would see a huge leap 
in its functional political power. In the summer of 1936 Catalonia 
would become, perhaps, the first anarchist community since man 
left the wilderness. They gained  power the same way the anarchists 
had gained any of their progress: in the streets. Though fantasies of 
common men, women, and children manning makeshift barricades 
are more apocryphal than factual, it was the anarchist militias that 
provided the major defense of Barcelona and as such found them-
19 Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth an Account of the Social and Politi-
cal Background of the Civil War, Univ. Press, 1967, 115.
20 Julian Casanova, Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain: 1931-
1939, Taylor & Francis, 2014, 7-9.
85
Hunter White
selves at the levers of local power. The looming threat of fascism had 
tempered their puritanism, and a radical restructuring of society was 
not yet in the cards.21 
Unlike the nationalist rebels, the anarchists could not rely on 
foreign aid from any western powers.22  Production could not cease, 
and the conditions were now worse than under the previous regime. 
Many of the reforms that had been earned by their collective ac-
tion now had to be suspended in order to keep the war economy 
competitive with the combined efforts of the Fascist machine. This, 
combined with rising inflation, made life for the proletariat in the 
proletarian paradise all the worse, and now the entire workforce had 
learned the effectiveness of sabotaging production through late arriv-
al, slow labor, theft, and other forms of worker’s protest.23 It was now 
the anarchists who had to handle their own militant workers and 
their strikes. Even in Catalan, where the urban anarchist dream came 
as close to being realized as anywhere outside the Gates of Eden, its 
own proponents rebelled against it when they felt it to have degraded 
them.
Faced with difficulty in governing, the anarchists focused more 
on the destruction of the symbols of the old order than political 
organization. Churches were ransacked and turned to barracks, ca-
fes, and dancehalls; icons were burned in mass bonfires, and priests 
21 Julian Casanova, Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain: 1931-
1939, Taylor & Francis, 2014, 101-107.
22  Allen Guttmann, The Wound in the Heart: America and the Spanish 
Civil War, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, 21.
23 Julian Casanova, Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain: 1931-
1939, Taylor & Francis, 2014, 140.
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were forbidden from wearing the marks of their office.24 It was once 
again this base level anger, not politics, that spurned action. It was 
that same indomitable will to independence and dignity which most 
ingratiated Spain to anarchism which proved to be its greatest weak-
ness once power was attained. The urge to destroy and liberate can 
only take one so far before the need to construct and organize arises. 
When this must be done with enemies on all sides, from an interna-
tional Fascist conspiracy to Stalinists fearing a non-Soviet model of 
revolution to western nations abandoning a democracy in favor of a 
fascist dictatorship, it becomes nearly impossible. 
This inability to sustain their boldest achievements can be seen 
again and again. At the start of the war, revolutionary posters were 
emblazoned with jack-booted women marching to freedom, rifles 
on shoulders, but in less than a year the rhetoric had returned to 
the standard patriarchal call of valiant motherhood, and women had 
all but vanished from the militias.25 Old Spanish feelings outlasted 
revolutionary fervor. Even without women, these anarchist militias 
proved difficult to maintain. One by one they found themselves ab-
sorbed into the regular army. The egalitarian Durruti Column be-
came just another division in the Republican Army after the death 
of anarchist folk hero Buenaventura Durruti. They assimilated po-
litically as well, joining the central government with five members 
on Caballero’s Council of Defense.26 They had hoped to gain some 
24 Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth an Account of the Social and Politi-
cal Background of the Civil War, Univ. Press, 1967, 246.
25 Julian Casanova, Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain: 1931-
1939, Taylor & Francis, 2014,140. 109-111.
26 Ibid., 114-118.
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modicum of influence upon the central government as they had 
managed in their activist striking days, but this too proved detrimen-
tal. The CNT’s willingness to deal with the government splintered 
their support and led to several prominent leaders breaking off and 
starting splinter groups, the very plot of the conservative members 
of the Republican government.27 Without its radical polemic, in the 
eyes of the Spanish peasant, it was just another political party vying 
for power in a corrupted government. 
This inability to rule proved disastrous in Andalucía when the 
anarchists attempted to solve Spain’s great agrarian question which 
had plagued Spanish rulers since the Conde-Duque. Here they en-
acted Bakunin’s ideas for the collectivization of rural land and so-
cial-and-gender equality. But in doing so they butted heads with cen-
turies of cultural norms. The autonomy and independent nature of 
the Spanish people turned against them yet again. Andalusian peas-
ants rebelled against both over-collectivization of land and the liber-
ation of women. The communists seized this opportunity to drive a 
further wedge into their faction.28 In one final overture for assistance, 
the Spanish anarchists sought aide from the International Associ-
ation of Workers, by this time made up mostly of anarchists and 
Trotskyists. There, the only active anarchist movement on the planet 
was dressed down by foreign intellectuals for collaboration with the 
other anti-fascist movements and impure ideology. By the end of 
the conference the Spanish delegation returned to its trenches aidless 
and the other delegates returned to their downy beds, heads held 
27 Ibid., 121-122.
28 Ibid., 133-36.
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high for their purity of thought.29 They were too radical in the field 
and not radical enough in the lecture hall. Spanish anarchism was 
never a purely ideological movement. No matter the source of the 
ideas or the slogans, the movement was distinctly Spanish, rooted in 
Spanish traditions, Spanish culture, and Spanish history. Its propo-
nents in the field were interested in destroying the chains which had 
enslaved them, and anarchism promised the largest fire.
Conclusion
For the illiterate peasants and workers who made up the vast 
majority of the radical militias, it was never a question of fulfilling 
any ideology; it was instead the release of centuries of pent up anger. 
Anarchism was not a prescription for their problems but a tool for 
the destruction of the state which had so unjustly ruled them. It was 
not Marx’s end of history, nor was it Bakunin’s prelapsarian collec-
tive, it was instead Camus’s slave, declaring his humanity in the face 
of an unjust master and dying for the audacity.
29 Ibid., 149.
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